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When confronted by terrorism, 
governments normally respond with 
repression, which can aggravate the 
problem. But there are alternatives for 
dealing with terrorism, including social 
justice, technological resilience, 
communication choking, civilian 
counterterrorism and nonviolent 
action. 
 
In the face of a terrorist threat or attack, the 
first instinct of governments is repression: 
surveillance, arrests, interrogation, 
imprisonment, perhaps torture. Tough new 
laws may be introduced. Overall, the 
surveillance and coercive powers of the state 
are exercised and strengthened. I call this 
approach the repression paradigm, because it is
a coherent system of belief and action assumed 
to be correct despite any contrary evidence. 
The strengths of repression seem obvious 
enough: terrorists are watched, tracked down, 
captured and put out of commission, potential 
terrorists are deterred, and members of the 
public are reassured that strong action is being 
taken on their behalf. 
But repression has some serious weaknesses 
too. It may actually provoke terrorism by 
alienating some people, driving them to 
desperate measures. Terrorism expert Richard 
Rubenstein (1987: 232) says that the policy of 
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retaliation is really about revenge and is 
reminiscent of the blood feud. Indeed, some 
terrorists actually seek to provoke repression in 
order to reveal the iron fist of the state and 
incite more people to join their resistance. The 
result is a 'downward terror spiral' in which 
insurgents and repressive governments escalate
their violence. Paddy Hillyard (1993) studied 
how British people experienced the Prevention 
of Terrorism Acts. He says that 'Widespread 
violation of human rights in the so-called "war 
against terrorism" is counterproductive.' 
(Hillyard 2005). 
Another down side of repression is that 
government powers can be turned against 
others besides terrorists, such as trade 
unionists, environmentalists, artists, churches 
and ethnic minorities, indeed any individual or 
group that seems to pose a threat to those 
running the repression apparatus. Vietnamese 
fighting US troops during the Vietnam war 
were called terrorists. Opponents of the South 
African apartheid regime were called terrorists. 
Governments do not adhere to a consistent 
definition of terrorism. Instead, the word 
'terrorist' is used as a political label, a term of 
condemnation (Geerty 1997; Hocking 2004). 
Governments seldom discuss the negative 
effects of repression. These are discounted, 
ignored or treated as unfortunate, but seldom 
used as a reason to reconsider their whole 
approach. The repression approach is indeed a 
paradigm because alternatives are not on the 
agenda. If a terrorist attack is foiled, this is said 
to show the value of police powers. If an attack 
occurs, it is said to demonstrate that more 
police funding and powers are needed. 
Whatever happens, it does not shake the 
repression mindset. 
The repression paradigm directs attention to 
terrorism by non-state groups. The very 
existence of state terrorism - which kills vastly 
more than the non-state variety - is seldom 
even acknowledged, much less treated as an 
urgent problem (Stohl and Lopez 1984). 
There are alternatives to repression, though 
they receive little attention and little funding. 
Here I look at five possibilities. The first, social 
justice, is often recommended by progressives 
as a way to prevent terrorism. The second, 
technological resilience, has been 
recommended by commentators on 
Instead of repression http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/06sa.html
3 of 12 10/11/2006 10:43 AM
technological risk. The third, communication 
choking, arises from an examination of 
terrorism as a method of communication. The 
fourth, civilian counterterrorism, is highlighted 
by actions by the passengers on United Airlines 
Flight 93. The fifth, nonviolent action, is a 
well-developed alternative to violence for 
promoting social change. Each of these options 
is outlined briefly in the following sections in 
order to show that there are alternatives to 
repression. 
Social justice 
Contrary to popular beliefs, terrorists are not 
inherently sadistic, irrational or malicious. Roy 
Baumeister (1997) in his insightful book Evil 
argues that people who perpetrate cruelty and 
violence are individuals like anyone else, seeing 
themselves as victims or as justified. People 
certainly commit evil deeds, but according to 
Baumeister, the idea of pure evil is a myth, 
though an exceedingly powerful one. 
Some people who resort to violence are driven 
by their own beliefs about social justice. Well 
known examples include violent challenges to 
Israeli confiscation and occupation of 
Palestinian lands, to South Africa's previous 
apartheid system of white rule and to British 
rule over Northern Ireland. The advocates of 
social justice say that if perceived injustices are 
acknowledged, addressed and rectified, much 
of the incentive for terrorism would be 
removed. 
In many conflicts, both sides feel aggrieved, 
perceiving themselves as the victims of 
injustice. In such circumstances, they may feel 
justified in using violence. Those with more 
power are able to use violence with the backing 
of law and/or authority, such as when 
governments declare war or use force against 
internal dissidents. When those with less power
use violence, they are commonly labelled 
terrorists. 
It seems sensible to believe that promoting 
social justice can reduce the incentive for 
insurgent terrorism, though certainly not 
eliminate it - after all, some terrorists, such as 
the Ku Klux Klan and Al Qaeda, oppose racial 
or sexual equality. Strangely, though, there 
seem to be no empirical studies of the 
effectiveness of social justice as a means to 
reduce terrorism. 
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Resilient technology 
Terrorism does not require advanced 
technology. A knife, a gun or a simple bomb can
be enough to injure and kill and certainly to 
frighten. But the biggest fear-generator is 
terrorists obtaining weapons of mass 
destruction. One of the main arguments for 
invading Iraq was to stop Saddam Hussein 
giving WMD to terrorists. 
Looking at the vulnerabilities of industrial 
society to violent attack, the biggest risks stem 
from large technological systems such as power 
plants, nuclear facilities and chemical factories. 
These are characterised by large investments, 
dependence on experts and serious potential 
risks. They are obvious targets for anyone 
setting out to cause maximum damage. 
It is quite possible to design alternative 
technological systems to achieve the same ends 
but without large risks (Martin 2001). Critics of 
the nuclear fuel cycle - uranium mining, 
enrichment, nuclear power, reprocessing - have
argued for decades that it creates the risk of 
nuclear terrorism. Getting rid of nuclear 
technology would definitely reduce the risk. 
Nuclear medicine could continue, because most
radioisotopes can be produced using cyclotrons.
More generally, large power plants -fossil fuel 
and large dams as well as nuclear power - lock 
in technological vulnerability. The alternative is 
small-scale wind, solar and hydro power, 
combined with energy efficiency and urban 
planning to reduce energy requirements. Such 
energy alternatives have been investigated and 
promoted since the 1970s and are feasible 
today. 
Redesigning technological systems to minimise 
vulnerability to attack would reduce 
opportunities for terrorists. It would not 
eliminate terrorism, but it would certainly 
make people safer. 
Communication choking 
Media coverage is the lifeblood of terrorism. 
Indeed, terrorism has been called 'a violent 
communication strategy' (Schmid and de Graaf 
1982: 15; see also Nacos 2002; Tuman 2003). 
As a communication process from sender to 
receiver, the terrorist is the sender, the victim is 
the message generator, the western mass media
Instead of repression http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/06sa.html
5 of 12 10/11/2006 10:43 AM
serve as the communication channel and the 
public is the receiver. The effect of 9/11 came 
not just from the scale of the attack but from its 
intense media coverage. 
It is well known that mass media focus on 
conflict, especially violence. A peaceful rally of 
thousands may receive no coverage except for a 
minor scuffle that makes the whole event 
appear violent. The reporting of suicide 
bombings in Israel is so intense that few people 
realise that there are large numbers of peaceful 
protests by both Israelis and Palestinians, often 
jointly. 
In essence, the mass media amplify the actions 
of those using violence so that peaceful 
activities become virtually invisible to the wider 
public. The routine operation of the news media
serves to highlight bad news and submerge 
good news. 
There is no easy way to rectify this situation, 
but it certainly deserves more attention. 
Government censorship is not a promising 
solution, because it is likely to create more 
interest in the forbidden topic. Another 
possibility is public pressure to create a 
different culture within news organisations, in 
which giving publicity to terrorism is seen as 
akin to revealing war plans or alerting criminals 
to attempts to arrest them. These are close 
analogies. The mass media, in reporting 
terrorist threats and actions, are unwittingly 
serving as tools of the terrorists. Choking the 
flow of words and images about terrorism 
would greatly reduce the attraction of terrorism
in the first place. 
The idea of communication choking of 
terrorism is hard to grasp, so entrenched are 
ideas of freedom of the press. The key here is 
the pervasive bias in the way this freedom is 
used, with obsessive attention to violence and a 
general disregard for peaceful protest. If the 
mass media chose to exercise their freedom 
differently, then terrorism would be suffocated. 
It is unfair to blame only the media because, 
although they play a key role in setting the 
political agenda, they also respond to the 
public. If consumers of the news switched off 
when terrorism stories came on, the media 
would get the message. But how likely is this? 
Who has the capacity to say, 'I'm not going to 
watch news about terrorism, because it only 
helps terrorists?' 
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Civilian counterterrorism 
On 11 September 2001, four US passenger 
aircraft were hijacked, all intended as tools of 
attack. Two hit the Trade Center towers in close
succession. This gave an obvious signal that 
there might be other attacks. Of the other two 
hijacked aircraft, American Flight 77 reached 
the hijackers' target, the Pentagon, but United 
Airlines Flight 93 did not. It was brought down 
by direct action by passengers. 
Elaine Scarry (2003) in an essay titled 
'Citizenship in emergency' contrasts these 
different outcomes. She compares the 
government's response to Flight 77, in which 
centralised decision-making was slow and 
ineffectual, with the passengers' response in 
Flight 93. These passengers collected 
information - especially using mobile phones - 
shared it with each other, engaged in a rapid 
participatory decision-making process, and 
then proceeded to overcome the hijackers. They
lost their lives but would have anyway and in 
the event probably saved the lives of many 
others. 
Scarry argues that this 'egalitarian defence 
model' is the only one that worked, both on 
9/11 and against the 'shoe bomber' in December
2001. She points out that the hijackers, before 
their action, worried about passenger resistance
but not about interception by fighter aircraft. 
If the approach of civilian counterterrorism is 
taken seriously, aircraft passengers would be 
given information and training in detecting 
threats, gathering information, making 
judgements, reaching collective decisions and 
taking action. This is a clear challenge to the 
repression paradigm, which advocates tighter 
airport security and armed guards on flights, 
making passengers at best passive recipients of 
protection and at worst the focus of suspicions 
and harassment. 
The civilian model can be applied more widely 
than defending against hijackings. As well as 
threat recognition, information collection and 
decision making, it can include skills in 
disabling weapons, detecting conspiracies and 
reacting in an emergency. 
The repression approach includes limited 
citizen input, namely reporting suspicions to 
government agencies, but this is superficial 
Instead of repression http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/06sa.html
7 of 12 10/11/2006 10:43 AM
compared to the civilian model. More 
importantly, the repression approach, by 
putting everyone under suspicion and 
introducing penalties for having any connection
with terrorism, actually discourages citizen 
participation, by making people afraid not only 
of terrorists but afraid that by taking an interest 
in terrorist techniques, they might become 
suspects themselves. The repression approach 
fosters distrust and disempowerment, whereas 
the civilian model is based on trust and 
empowerment. 
The civilian model can also be applied to 
intelligence, the process of gathering and 
making sense of information about threats. In 
the repression approach, the intelligence 
system is based on secrecy. In the civilian 
model, multiple agencies would make their 
findings publicly available and thus subject to 
testing. A precedent is the Shipping Research 
Bureau, based in the Netherlands in the 1980s, 
which gathered information about ships 
violating the embargo on trade with apartheid 
South Africa. By publishing its findings, it fixed 
its mistakes, developed new sources and gained
credibility. Its accuracy was far greater than 
much of the work of Dutch secret government 
agencies at the time (de Valk 2005). 
The promise of publicly shared intelligence is 
suggested by analogues of free software and 
wikipedia, the encyclopaedia based on public 
contributions. In these cases, the keys to their 
success are harnessing contributions from 
many volunteers to an outcome that can be 
inspected by anyone. The civilian model is 
based on trust, openness and participation, 
which reinforce each other. It is in stark 
contrast to the repression approach, which is 
based on a destructive synergy of distrust, 
secrecy and dependence on professionals. 
Nonviolent action 
The methods used by terrorists are based on 
violence: bombings, hijackings, assassinations. 
These are usually contrasted with conventional 
means of political action, such as voting, 
lobbying, and publicity. But there is a third 
major option: nonviolent action. 
For bringing about social change, nonviolent 
action is an alternative to terrorism. If 
governments supported nonviolent action, this 
would undercut the attraction of terrorism. It 
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would also help promote social justice and 
thereby reduce incentives for terrorism. 
Nonviolent action includes a range of methods, 
including rallies, social ostracism, fasts, 
boycotts, strikes, sit-ins and setting up 
alternative institutions (Sharp 1973, 2005). 
Nonviolent action means no physical violence 
by the activists, though in many cases violence 
is used against them. Property damage, such as 
sabotage in a factory, is on the boundary 
between nonviolence and violence. 
Nonviolent action receives little government 
funding or media attention compared to 
violence, but nevertheless has had some notable
successes in the past century. Most famously, 
the Indian independence movement, led by 
Gandhi, was based on nonviolent action, 
achieving success with few lives lost. In contrast 
to their restraint in India, the British in Kenya 
used torture, killings and concentration camps 
in putting down the violent Mau Mau rebellion 
(Elkins 2005). 
Nonviolent action has been the prime means to 
overthrow many repressive rulers, such as in 
the Philippines in 1986, Eastern Europe in 
1989, Indonesia in 1998 and Serbia in 2000 
(Ackerman and DuVall 2000; Schock 2005; 
Zunes et al. 1999). 
For those who want to help create a better 
society, nonviolent action is a well-developed 
approach that has many advantages compared 
to violence. It tends to reduce death and 
suffering, because it is hard to justify violence 
against nonviolent protesters. It allows 
participation by women, people with 
disabilities, children and the elderly, whereas 
the majority of soldiers and terrorists are young 
fit men. With nonviolent action, the means - 
nonviolence - are compatible with the ends, a 
more peaceful society. Therefore, nonviolent 
change is less likely to lead to new forms of 
oppression than violent social change. 
There are several cases when nonviolent action 
was more successful than violence. Armed 
struggle against apartheid was largely a failure. 
It was only after anti-apartheid struggle 
switched to nonviolent action that it was a 
success. In East Timor, armed struggle after 
1975 was unsuccessful. Only in the late 1980s, 
after Fretilin refrained from armed attacks and 
emphasised peaceful protest in urban areas did 
international opinion switch significantly 
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against the Indonesian occupiers, most notably 
after the Dili massacre in 1991. 
The Palestine Liberation Organisation used 
terrorism for many years with a singular lack of 
success. Then in 1987 the intifada 
spontaneously emerged, gaining widespread 
support in Palestine and winning far greater 
sympathy internationally. 
In contrast to nonviolent action as a means of 
social change, violence has a very poor record. 
Most armed struggles are unsuccessful. There is
not a single case in which people's armed 
struggle in an advanced industrial society has 
overthrown the government. The successes of 
armed struggle in countries such as in China, 
Vietnam and Algeria have come at a terrific 
human cost, with hundreds of thousands killed 
and often a continuing legacy of repressive 
government. In Palestine, the second intifada, 
beginning in 2000, has been far less effective 
due to the use of violence, most notably suicide 
bombings. More widely, Muslim terrorism has 
damaged sympathy for Muslims generally. 
If those who are dissatisfied with what is 
happening around them knew about the power 
of nonviolent action and could join nonviolent 
movements, many of them would not consider 
violence (Rubenstein 1987). The development 
of effective nonviolent movements is a way to 
reduce the attraction of terrorism. 
Unfortunately, the repression approach does 
not help this process. By clamping down on 
civil liberties, repression makes it harder to 
engage in nonviolent action, reducing 
participation and hence encouraging some to 
believe that violence is their only option. For 
governments and citizens, a far more 
productive option is to educate and train 
people, from school onwards, in how to engage 
in nonviolent action in responsible and effective 
ways. With these tools of social struggle in their 
hands, citizens could pursue their goals and, 
through their example, show that there are 
better paths to the future than terrorism. 
Conclusion 
The repression approach to terrorism has a 
virtual stranglehold on government policy and 
public debate. The mass media, through 
saturation coverage of both terrorism and 
anti-terrorism, encourage acceptance of the 
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repression paradigm. This is a self-perpetuating
cycle, because repression so often provokes 
terrorism (Korte 2005; Soule 1989). The policy 
of collective punishment, when an entire 
community is attacked because of the actions of
a few within it - such as Israeli operations 
against Palestinian towns and US operations 
against Afghanistan and Iraq - strengthens 
those who want to widen the conflict, namely 
both terrorists and warmongers. 
Yet there are alternatives. I have outlined five - 
social justice, resilient technology, 
communicating choking, civilian 
counterterrorism and nonviolent action - that 
have great promise. None of them is the 
solution to all terrorism, but any one would 
very likely reduce terrorism with far fewer 
adverse consequences than the repression 
approach. 
These alternatives deserve far greater attention. 
So why haven't they received it? The answer is 
straightforward: every one of them poses a 
challenge to vested interests, whether 
governments, corporations or security 
establishments. 
These alternatives are also challenges to 
citizens. Instead of leaving the problem to 
professionals, the alternatives require greater 
personal participation in efforts to oppose 
terrorism and create a society in which violence
is less attractive. That is challenging but also 
empowering. 
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